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Intellectual Property

by Laurence P. Colton*
Nigamnarayan Acharya"
and John C. Bush**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law developments relevant to Georgia in the
area of intellectual property during the period from January 1, 2006 to
December 31, 2006. Intellectual property law comprises several discrete
yet overlapping areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual
property law are patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade
secret law.' Because patent law and copyright law are provided for in
the United States Constitution,2 these decisions are based in federal law
and are litigated in federal courts. Trademark law and trade secret law
have both federal3 and state aspects, and the cases regarding these
* Partner in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts
University (B.S. Ch.E, 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
** Associate in the law firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Wisconsin-Madison (B.S., 1998); Emory University (J.D., 2001). Member,
State Bar of Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
*** Associate in the law firm of Powell Goldstein LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Duke
University (B.S, 2003); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 2006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
1. Some secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article include trade dress
and know-how.
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution affords Congress the
power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The terms "Authors" and "Writings" refer to copyright, and
the terms "Inventors" and "Discoveries" refer to patent.
3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation and provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
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areas are based on federal or state law. However, the more intricate
cases are often litigated in the United States federal courts.
The Authors have not attempted to include all cases that touch upon
intellectual property but instead have selected decisions that are of more
significance or interest or that may indicate a particular direction in
these areas of law. Although the cited cases often have multiple issues,
the Authors have reported only on the more relevant or interesting
intellectual property issues. As such, this Article will focus on developments selected primarily from the federal courts that are controlling or
binding on federal courts in Georgia.
II.

PATENT CASES

A.

Claim Construction
Patent claims are usually in the form of a series of numbered
expressions that follow the description of the invention in a patent or
patent application. Patent claims define, in technical or scientific terms
coupled with legal terms, the protection conferred by a patent, and they
are often paramount both in patent application examination proceedings
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and in
litigation in the courts.
In cases involving patent infringement, the claims must be first
construed to determine the metes and bounds of the patent, that is, the
scope of coverage or protection of the patent.4 Patent claims are
construed using a number of factors, and patent applicants can be their
own lexicographers by defining terms in the patent or during the
prosecution of the patent application in the USPTO. As will be seen,
claims construction has been a dynamic area over the last year.
In Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,' the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals ("Federal Circuit")6 overturned the grant of a
preliminary injunction and held that the lower court had misapplied
claim differentiation' by interpreting the word "adjustable" too broad-

§ 8, cl. 3.
4. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
5. 438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
6. This appeals court hears all appeals from all federal district courts related to patent
law.
7. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, each claim in a patent is presumed to
cover a different aspect of the invention than each of the other claims. This doctrine can
be used to help assert a broad claim scope in the case where a claim standing alone might
be construed as having either a broad or a narrow interpretation. If a dependent claim is
added that depends on a "previous" claim but is specifically drawn to the narrower
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ly.8 The lower court granted a preliminary injunction in part over the
use of the term "adjustable" 9 in two independent claims and its absence
in a third independent claim, which the lower court interpreted to mean
that all ranges of adjustability were covered by the patent. ° Noting
that "(1) claim differentiation takes on relevance in the context of a
claim construction that would render additional, or different, language
in another independent claim superfluous; and (2) claim differentiation
'can not broaden claims beyond their correct scope,'" the Federal Circuit
vacated the preliminary injunction."
In Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental International, L.C.
("EEP), 2 the Federal Circuit held that a typical percentage composition
range in a solution's preferred embodiment should not be read to narrow
the claim.'3 In a patent relating to gas lines, Conoco used the closedended term "consisting of' instead of the more open-ended transition
term "comprising" in the claim language, and EEI argued that the closed
term did not permit the inclusion of impurities. 4 The court noted that
the use of "consisting of' in the claim language did not exclude
additional components that were unrelated to the invention, similar to
the way that "impurities that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
art would ordinarily associate with a component" do not exclude
infringement.
Specifically, although impurities were not part of the
invention as claimed by Conoco, the court held that the presence of
6
ordinary impurities would not preclude infringement of the patent.
In Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. InternationalTrade Commission, 7 the
Federal Circuit held that a patent claim that fails to provide a proper
antecedent basis to an element may not necessarily be indefinite and
invalid.'" In a case before the International Trade Commission ("ITC"),
Energizer alleged that various importers infringed a patent for an
electrolytic alkaline battery cell by importing batteries into the United

interpretation, then the "previous" claim is construed to be different.
8. Curtiss-Wright, 438 F.3d at 1380-81.
9. The claim limitation recited "an adjustable dynamic, live loaded seat coupled to said
main body." Id. at 1377.
10. Id. at 1380.
11. Id. at 1381 (quoting Fantasy Sports Props. v. Sportsline.com, 278 F.3d 1108, 111516 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
12. 460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13. Id. at 1358.
14. Id. at 1359-60.
15. Id. at 1360.
16. Id. at 1360-61.
17. 435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
18. Id. at 1370.
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States. The ITC found that the patent was invalid for indefiniteness
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2"9 because the patent claims
referenced an element ("said zinc anode")20 that lacked an antecedent
basis.21 In reversing the ITC's finding, the Federal Circuit held that
while the claim did not conform to accepted claim drafting practices, the
claim was not indefinite as a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood the scope of the claim.22
From these representative cases, the Federal Circuit appears to be
relying more on the patent specification to interpret the breadth and
scope of the claims. As such, it is becoming even more imperative for the
patent practitioner to use care to avoid limiting language when drafting
a patent application.
B.

Standing

As federal courts cannot grant advisory opinions under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, an actual case or controversy-standing-must
exist to obtain a declaratory judgment.23 Over the last year, several
cases have examined standing for issuing a declaratory judgment in
patent cases. Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit examined cases
involving standing.
In Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.Miracle Optics, Inc.,24 the Federal Circuit
held that a patentee retains standing even when the patent has been
exclusively licensed for a limited period.2 ' Aspex Eyewear appealed a
decision dismissing an action against Miracle Optics and Viva Optique
on the ground that Aspex lacked standing to sue for infringement of a
patent that had been exclusively licensed2 1 to Chic Optic for a limited

19. "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
20. Energizer Holdings, 435 F.3d at 1368. According to conventional or accepted claim
drafting practices, a single element should be introduced with an "a" or "an." In this case,
the claim should have included the element as "a zinc anode."
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1371.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. 434 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
25. Id. at 1342-43.
26. The agreement with Chic conveyed
(1) the exclusive right to make, use, and sell in the United States products covered
by the patent, (2) the first right to commence legal action against third parties for
infringement of the patent and the right to retain any award of damages from
actions initiated by Chic, and (3) a virtually unfettered right to sublicense all of
its rights to a third party.
Id. at 1338.
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period."
While an exclusive licensing agreement can be tantamount
to an assignment if it substantially conveys all of the rights in a patent
(which negates standing),28 the court held that the limited duration of
the license agreement allowed Aspex to retain rights in the patent
sufficient to have standing for a patent infringement lawsuit against a
party other than the exclusive licensee.29
In Microchip Technology, Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc.,3° the
Federal Circuit held that Microchip's threats against Chamberlain's
customers did not create an actual controversy for seeking a declaratory
judgment."' Chamberlain had threatened one of Microchip's customers
with litigation but subsequently settled the matter before this litigation
arose.3 2 The court rejected efforts to impute legal threats to one of
Microchip's customers as a basis for establishing a claim for 3Chamber3
lain, who was otherwise at "patent peace" with the patentee.
C.

PreliminaryInjuction

In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,34 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that traditional equity principles must be applied in deciding whether
to grant permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.35 In
that case, the plaintiff, MercExchange, held a business method patent
directed to "establishing a central authority to promote trust among
participants" in an electronic marketplace."
Half.com, which later
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of eBay, infringed on this patent.37
The Court held that the standard for granting a permanent injunction
in a patent infringement case should follow well-established principles
of equity in that a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

27. Id.
28. Id. at 1340.
29. Id. at 1341.
30. 441 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
31. Id. at 945.
32. Id. at 941.
33. Id. at 942-43.

34. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
35. Id. at 1838-39.
36.
37.

Id. at 1839.
Id.
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warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction.38
The Court noted that in the context of copyright infringement, it has
"consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable
follows a
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically
39
determination that a copyright has been infringed."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts, including
the Federal Circuit, had erred by imposing additional criteria that cut
against having these factors.4 ° Specifically in this case, the Federal
Circuit had imposed a general rule that a permanent injunction should
follow a finding of patent infringement. 4' Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit had incorrectly suggested that an inventor's willingness to
license the patented product should weigh against granting a permanent
injunction on the inventor's behalf.42 Nonetheless, the Court noted that
a patent was a grant of the right to exclude.' The Court modified the
longstanding policy of granting a permanent injunction as a remedy to
infringing on those rights; it opined that a permanent injunction should
be enforced only to the extent necessary to maintain those rights and is
not always necessary when monetary damages are adequate to address
the infringement.'
In PHG Technologies, LLC v. St. John Companies,45 the Federal
Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction where the district court failed
to make any "explicit finding" regarding the utility of the invention in
a design patent.46 The district court granted a preliminary injunction
against St. John and found that PHG was likely to succeed in proving
patent infringement of two design patents covering certain ornamental
designs for medical label sheets.4" St. John initially alleged that the
48
patents at issue were invalid because the invention was functional,
but on appeal, St. John challenged only the likelihood of success on the
merits factor in the district court analysis because a party seeking a

38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 1840 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 1841.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1840.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1841.
45. 469 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
46. Id. at 1367.
47. Id. at 1364.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000) requires that a design patent cover only the ornamental
aspect of an invention. A design patent covering designs that are functional or have utility
are invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
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49
preliminary injunction must show this factor to obtain relief.
Although the district court found a "multitude of alternative designs" for
PHG's medical labels, the district court failed to make any findings as
to whether these alternative designs were as equally useful as the
medical sheets.5 " Without this finding, the Federal Circuit held that
a "substantial question of invalidity" existed and vacated the preliminary
injunction."'

D. Invalidation
Patent invalidity is a powerful counterclaim or defense to patent
infringement. A patent may be invalid for numerous technical and
substantive reasons. In three instructive cases in 2006, the Federal
Circuit addressed several of these reasons, including the scope of
correction available for reissued patents, indefiniteness5 2 of a claim
containing informalities, and issues related to patentability.
In Medrad, Inc. v. 7yco Healthcare Group LP,53 the Federal Circuit
held that 35 U.S.C. § 251, 4 should be construed liberally to allow a
patentee to correct any error that would result in invalid claims or an
invalid patent.5 5 During prosecution, the patentee failed to file
supplemental declarations" with regard to a prior reissue patent,

49. PHG Technologies, 469 F.3d at 1364-65.
50. Id. at 1367.
51. Id.
52. A claim that is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is invalid.
53. 466 F.3d 1047 (2006).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) reads as follows:
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right
to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the surrender of such patent and the
payment of the fee required by law, reissue the patent for the invention disclosed
in the original patent, and in accordance with a new and amended application, for
the unexpired part of the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be
introduced into the application for reissue.
55. Medrad, 466 F.3d at 1051.
56. The patent reissue regulations, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.171-1.179, require an applicant to
file an oath or declaration with an application for reissue. The declaration must state that:
(1) [tlhe applicant believes the original patent to be wholly or partly inoperative
or invalid by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the
patentee claiming more or less than the patentee had the right to claim in the
patent, stating at least one error being relied upon as the basis for reissue; and
(2) All errors being corrected in the reissue application up to the time of filing of
the oath or declaration under [37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)] arose without any deceptive
intention on the part of the applicant.
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which corrected overclaiming and inventorship errors, and the assignee
later procured a subsequent reissue patent to remedy the patentee's
failure to file the declarations.57 As these errors are procedural errors
rather than relating to the scope of the claims, the lower court found
that these corrections did not fall within the guidelines of § 251 and held
that the patent was invalid.5 8 In reversing the decision, the Federal
Circuit interpreted the language of § 251 as expressly including
procedural errors as well as substantive errors. 59 The court noted that
the statute was remedial in nature, based on fundamental principles of
equity and fairness, and should be construed liberally." By correcting
overclaiming and inventorship errors in the prior reissue patent without
the required supplemental declarations, the patent applicant was not
claiming more than it was entitled to claim and the reissue was valid
under § 251.61
In Abbott Laboratories& Central Glass Co. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical
Products,Inc.,62 the Federal Circuit held that a claim directed to newly
In response
discovered properties of the prior art is not patentable.
to health problems associated with Lewis acid developing in patients
taking Abbott's inhalation anesthetic sevoflurane, Abbott recognized that
mixing water with the anesthetic would stabilize the product and
deactivate the Lewis acids, and Abbott eventually patented this modified
product.' While acknowledging that this property was not known, the
Federal Circuit noted that cases have consistently held that a prior
reference anticipates an invention even when the relevant properties of
the thing disclosed were not appreciated at the time.65 Because the
prior art disclosed that water could be combined with sevoflurane,
Abbott's patent was invalid.66
In Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that cancelled drawings not published with the priority Canadian patent
application on which the U.S. patent application at issue was based

37 C.F.R. § 1.175(b)(1) (2006). A failure to submit a supplemental declaration, if required,
renders a reissue patent invalid. Id.
57. Medrad, 466 F.3d at 1049.
58. Id. at 1050.
59. Id. at 1051.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1053.
62. 471 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
63. Id. at 1368.
64. Id. at 1365.
65. Id. at 1367.
66. Id. at 1369.
67. 445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

20071

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1277

nonetheless satisfied the statutory bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 68 as a
printed publication and invalidated the patent-in-suit. 9 In this case,
the relevant drawings were merely included in the file wrapper.7 ° In
holding that the file wrapper was a printed publication, the court noted
that a person of ordinary skill in the art interested in the subject matter
of the patents-in-suit and exercising reasonable diligence would have
been able to locate the Canadian patent application. 71 As such, this file
wrapper was publicly accessible, and the published portion served as a
"roadmap" leading to the relevant drawings.7 2
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,7 the Federal Circuit
held that a product-by-process claim 74 is invalid when the product is in
the public domain even if the process through which the product is made
is allegedly novel.75 SmithKline had identified and patented a new
means of making a known pharmaceutical drug paroxetine, better
known under the trade name PAXIL®.7 6 In affirming the lower court's
invalidation of the patent, the court noted that "once a product is fully
disclosed
in the art, future claims to that same product are precluded." 77
E.

Inequitable Conduct

A party asserting that a patent is unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct for failure to submit information to the USPTO must prove
"materiality" and "intent" by clear and convincing evidence. Once
threshold findings of the materiality of the information relative to the
invention and the intent of the applicant (and the lawyer) are established, a court must weigh the two elements to determine whether the
equities warrant a conclusion of inequitable conduct.
In FerringB.V v. Barr Laboratories,Inc.,78 the Federal Circuit held
that the materiality and intent requirements of inequitable conduct were

68. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
69. Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378.
70. Id. at 1376.
71. Id. at 1378, 1379.
72. Id. at 1379. But see id. at 1380 (arguing that the patent as published did not
contain such a suggestion) (Linn, J., dissenting).
73. 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
74. A product-by-process claim is a claim to a product made by or through a particular
series of steps. These claims are generally useful for claiming compounds that are new and
difficult to otherwise define.
75. SmithKline, 439 F.3d at 1319.
76. Id. at 1314.
77. Id. at 1315.
78. 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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sufficiently satisfied to deny patent rights to the patentee.7 9 The
patent applicant submitted five declarations to the USPTO in an
attempt to obtain the patent-in-suit but failed to inform the USPTO that
four of the declarants received some funding or were employed by the
inventor.8 0 Although the court found this information to be material
because it would affect the credibility given to it by the examiner,"' no
allegation was made that the information was incorrect or inaccurate.82
However, the court held that deceptive intent could be inferred from the
83
circumstances and concluded the conduct was inequitable.
In Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Machine Works," the Federal
Circuit reiterated that materiality in an inequitable conduct determination requires a showing that "a reasonable examiner would have
considered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow the
parent application." 8
The inventor, who sought a patent for his
horizontal directional drilling process, had failed to disclose prior art
that he had disclosed in an unrelated patent application.8" In reversing
the lower court's finding of inequitable conduct that would have
rendered the patent unenforceable, the panel concluded that although no
material issues of fact existed as to whether misstatements had been
made in declarations to the USPTO in an attempt to obtain a patent, a
genuine issue remained as to
whether the inventor's failure to disclose
8 7
the prior art was material.
In Purdue Pharma LP v. Endo PharmaceuticalsInc.,88 the Federal
Circuit vacated a finding of inequitable conduct by the patentee and
remanded the case for reconsideration. 9 The patentee held a patent
in the painkiller oxycodone. 9 ° In obtaining this patent, the patentee
alleged that it had "surprisingly discovered" that the drug worked in
narrower ranges than previous similar opioid drugs.91 The court held
that although an applicant does not need to state whether a surprising

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
fact."
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1199 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1194 (majority opinion).
437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1313. The court also noted that "what a reference teaches is a question of
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1319.
438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1127.
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discovery is based on insight or experimental data, in this case the
applicant's implying that the discovery was based on experimental data
to obtain a patent made it material, though weakly so.92 Nonetheless,
the Federal Circuit held that the lower court had erred when it based its
finding of intent on internal memoranda in which the patentee's
employees expressed concern that obtaining a patent would be difficult.93 The court also held that the level of intent must be considered
in light of the level of materiality.94
In Agfa Corp. v. Creo Products, Inc.," the Federal Circuit held that
no jury trial right exists for claims of inequitable conduct.9" Before a
jury sat to consider the main infringement issues of the case, the lower
court conducted a bench trial on the issue of inequitable conduct and
found the patent-in-suit unenforceable. 97 The Federal Circuit held that
the Seventh Amendment does not extend to issues of inequitable conduct
or patent enforceability.98
F

Procedures

Aside from substantive issues of patent law, in 2006 the Federal
Circuit also resolved several procedural issues that directly affect patent
enforcement. Often, the Federal Circuit decides patent cases that bind
the district courts throughout the country on procedural issues.
In Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.,99 the Federal Circuit held that the
federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims of
unjust enrichment for stealing ideas.' 00
Thompson, a computer
programmer, sued Microsoft for unjust enrichment under Michigan law
alleging that Microsoft had stolen his idea and patented it. Thompson
further asserted that his unjust enrichment claim involved a substantial
1 1
question of patent law and therefore could be heard in federal court.
The district court granted Microsoft's motion for summary judgment,
finding that Thompson's state unjust enrichment claim was preempted
by federal patent law.'0 2 The Federal Circuit dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that it did not arise under federal patent

92. Id. at 1133.
93. Id. at 1134.
94. Id.
95. 451 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
96. Id. at 1375.
97. Id. at 1369.
98. Id. at 1375.
99. 471 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 1292.
101. Id. at 1289-90.
102. Id. at 1291.
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laws as required by Christianson& Holmes v. Vornado'0 ' and that the
right to relief did not depend on resolution of a substantial question of
federal patent law." 4 The court noted that Thompson could have
pursued a claim of misappropriation without involving elements of
patent law.105
In Aero Products International,Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp.,°106 the
Federal Circuit reversed an award of damages for both patent infringement and trademark infringement because such an award constituted
an impermissible double recovery.' °7 After a jury found that Intex was
infringing both the patent and the trademark used in connection with
the patented device, the jury awarded both patent damages, including
willful damages, and trademark damages.' 8 The court noted that
"even though damages are claimed based upon separate statutes or
causes of action, when the claims arise out of the same set of operative
facts, as is the case here, there may be only one recovery."0 9
G.

Sovereign Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment
grants states sovereign immunity that immunizes them from suit in
federal court without their consent."0 This immunity also applies to
patent infringement suits."'
In Tegic Communications Corp. v. Board of Regents of University of
Texas System," 2 the Federal Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment protected the University of Texas System (the "University") from
a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the University's patent
was invalid."' The University, as an arm of the State of Texas, fell4
within the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity protection.1
The University had sued thirty-nine customers of Tegic's software
system for patent infringement." 5 Although the University had
conceivably waived its immunity as to counterclaims filed by the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

486 U.S. 800 (1988).
Thompson, 471 F.3d at 1292.
Id. at 1291.
466 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1020.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
See id. at 11.
458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1344-45.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1337.
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University, it had not waived immunity as to "a new action, by a new
party, in a new forum."" 6 The court noted that Tegic could intervene
in the 17pending action filed by the University to preserve Tegic's
rights.
In Intel Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research
Organisation,"11 the Federal Circuit upheld the denial of sovereign
immunity to Australia's national science agency because its conduct fell
within the commercial activities exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA")." 9'
The Australian science agency had
attempted to negotiate patent licenses with major U.S. companies, but
when those negotiations broke down, the U.S. companies moved for
declaratory judgment as to noninfringement and invalidity.120 The
FSIA contained an exception that permitted suits against foreign
governments engaged in commercial activities.'12
Although the
Australian science agency argued that the negotiations were not
commercial activities because no contracts were formed, this argument
did not persuade the court."
The court concluded that the suit was
based on the Australian science agency's obtaining and subsequently
asserting U.S. patent rights.'3
H.

Patent and Antitrust

In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,124 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that possession of a patent used in a tying
agreement between the patented product and an unpatented product is
not per se illegal. 125 Illinois Tool Works, Inc., ("ITW") was sued by an
ink manufacturer on the allegation that ITW engaged in an illegal tying
and monopolization violation under the Sherman Act' 26 by licensing its
patented printheads only when used in combination with ink and ink
supply systems supplied by its subsidiary Trident. 127 Following a "long
history" of U.S. Supreme Court precedents (and noting that maybe the
law should be changed), the Federal Circuit held that a patent presump-

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1344.
455 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1371; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
Intel Corp., 455 F.3d at 1366, 1367.
Id. at 1369 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000)).
Id. at 1369-70.
Id. at 1371.
547 U.S. 28 (2006).
Id. at 41.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 32-33.
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tively defined the relevant market as the nationwide market for the
patented product itself, that is, the print heads, and created a presumption of market power within this market."8
In reversing the long history of precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the reality that tying patents to nonpatented items can be
fully consistent with a free, competitive market. 129 The mere possession of a patent will not prove the presumption of market power. °
Instead, an opposing party must demonstrate power in the relevant
market.' 3 Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected arguments
that the patentee's licensing requirements did not run afoul of antitrust
laws. "32
'
I.

Design Patent

A design patent is a patent granted on the ornamental design of a
functional item. Examples of ornamental designs protectable by design
patents include athletic shoe uppers, computer cases, jewelry, furniture,
and beverage containers. Defining the ornamental design can be a
difficult task.
In Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner International, LLC, 3 3 the
Federal Circuit rejected a patent licensee's attempt to redefine part of
the test for infringement of a design patent."
The license pertained
to a design patent for an "ornamental design for a sliding hook portion
of a vehicle steering wheel lock assembly" that includes multiple known
elements. 35 The district court held that infringement could not be
shown because each
of the alleged elements of the design was disclosed
3 8
in the prior art.
In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit restated that two
separate tests must be proven to establish infringement of a design
patent: (a) the "ordinary observer" test and (b) the "point of novelty"
test. "37
'
Of these tests, the patentee attempted to redefine the "point
of novelty" test, which considers "whether the accused device ...
appropriates the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 41.
437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1385-86.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id.
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from the prior art."13 The licensee did so by claiming that the court
should collectively consider the eight points of alleged novelty.13 9 The
court held that such an approach would have permitted patent rights to
140
a device that offered no new novelty over the prior art.
J.

Miscellaneous

In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,141 the Federal
Circuit concluded that patent exhaustion 4 2 did not occur with respect
to a patentee's claims. 143 LG sued several of Intel Corporation's'44
customers, including Bizcom, for infringing its patents for a certain
chipset by combining the chipset with non-Intel products. 45 The
Federal Circuit found that patent exhaustion was not triggered because
LG set express conditions in the license that required its customers not
to combine the products in a manner that would infringe Intel's
rights.146 Further, the court noted that method patents could not be
exhausted in the same manner as device patents because the "sale
of a
147
device does not exhaust a patentee's rights in its method claims."
In Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA), Inc.,148 the
Federal Circuit held that Mayne infringed Abraxis's patent on Abraxis's
anesthetic formulation patent covering DIPRIVAN® by substituting
calcium trisodium DTPA ("DTPA") for EDTA ("edetate")."49 Interestingly, Abraxis received a patent on this substitution but did not assert
the patent against Mayne. 5 ' In affirming that DTPA was equivalent

138. Id. at 1384-85 (quoting Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
139. Id. at 1385.
140. Id. at 1386.
141. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
142. The patent exhaustion doctrine, or "first sale doctrine," is an affirmative defense
under which the unrestricted sale of a patented product, by or with the patentee's
authority, exhausts the patentee's right to control further sale and use of that product by
asserting the patent. The main theory of the doctrine is that the patent right is exhausted
when the patentee is rewarded for disclosing the invention in the market by selling the
patented product and should not be allowed to reap profit twice from the same product.
Id. at 1369-70.
143. Id. at 1370.
144. Intel, Inc. was not a defendant as Intel was a licensee.
145. LG Electronics, 453 F.3d at 1368.
146. Id. at 1370.
147. Id.
148. 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
149. Id. at 1382.
150. Id. at 1373.
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(under the doctrine of equivalents)' 51 to edetate, the Federal Circuit
concluded that DTPA performed substantially the same function in
152
substantially the same way to achieve the same results as edetate.
In concluding that DTPA was unforeseeable as an equivalent in the
product at the time of patenting, the court appeared persuaded by the
fact that Abraxis received a subsequent patent on the alleged equivalent. s3 In rejecting Mayne's position that known interchangeability
bars a finding of equivalence, the court noted that known equivalence is
only one factor in the doctrine of equivalent analysis.1
In Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,55 the
Federal Circuit reversed summary judgment because of a misapplication
of the doctrine of equivalents related to an invention for providing "a
channel through the abdominal cavity through which instruments can
be inserted during laparoscopic surgery."'
The court noted that the
"the inquiry should be restricted to the way in which the structure
performs the properly-defined function and should not be influenced by
the manner in which the structure performs other, extraneous functions."5 7
In Go Medical Industries Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp.,158 the Federal
Circuit rejected a licensee's attempt to terminate prematurely its
obligations in a patent licensing agreement pertaining to a catheter
invention."'
The parties had agreed that the licensing agreement
would terminate once the licensed patent was no longer enforceable.
After a third party, C.R. Bard, won a district court judgment that the
patent was invalid, Medical Marketing Group, Inc. ("MMG"), the
licensee, stopped paying royalties and began placing the royalties in
escrow. After the third party's case was reversed on appeal, Go sued
MMG and Rusch-to whom MMG had sold its asset-for infringement,
and the patent was found invalid in that lawsuit. Invoking the Lear
doctrine,"6 MMG subsequently demanded the escrowed monies back

151. The doctrine of equivalents is a legal doctrine that allows a court to hold a party
liable for patent infringement when the infringing device or process does not fall within the
literal scope of a patent claim but is equivalent to the invention as claimed. Id. at 1379.
152. Id. at 1382.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 448 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
156. Id. at 1327.
157. Id. at 1334.
158. 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
159. Id. at 1267, 1273.
160. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that a licensee was not estopped
from challenging the validity of the licensor's patent. 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969). For
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from Go, as its position was that it paid royalties on an invalid patent
from the time of the finding of invalidity in the third-party litigation. 6 ' The Federal Circuit disagreed and held (1) that the previous
litigation did not affect the contractual relationship between MMG and
Go and (2) that the Lear doctrine did not protect MMG from liability for
royalties up until MMG stopped paying royalties and gave notice to
Go.

1 62

In On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc., 163 the
Federal Circuit rejected a claim of joint infringement by On Demand
Machine Corporation ("ODMC") against Amazon.com and two other
defendants." ODMC held a patent in which a customer could browse
through a book's pages at a computer kiosk. If the customer purchased
the book, it then would be printed, preferably on the same physical
premises as the kiosk. ODMC alleged that a customer could purchase
a book through Amazon.com and that Amazon.com would then request
that another defendant print the book.'
Although the court concluded that this action by two separate entities in tandem could constitute
joint infringement, the court rejected this argument because accessing
Amazon.com did not involve a kiosk as required in the patent's claims."

III.

TRADEMARK CASES

Federal case law controlling Georgia trademark law essentially comes
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the federal district courts in Georgia. In the 2006 time period, three
interesting cases in the field of trademark law were decided by the
Eleventh Circuit and the district courts in Georgia.
In Bavaro Palace, S.A. v. Vacation Tours, Inc.,"' the Eleventh
Circuit rejected hotel-owner Bavaro Palace's claim for trademark
infringement and anticybersquatting violations against wholesale and

various policy reasons, a licensee may cease payments due under a license, that is,
contractual royalty provisions will not Le enforced during the time the licensee is
challenging patent validity in the courts. Id. at 673. The Federal Circuit has since
clarified that the Lear doctrine does not prevent a patentee from recovering royalties until
the date the licensee first challenges the validity of the patent. Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
161. Go Medical Indus., 471 F.3d at 1269-70.
162. Id. at 1273.
163. 442 F.3d 1331-(Fed. Cir. 2006).
164. Id. at 1345.
165. Id. at 1344.
166. Id. at 1345.
167. 203 F. App'x 252 (11th Cir. 2006).
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retail travel agency Vacation Tours."
During a promotional period,
Vacation Tours was an authorized promoter of Bavaro Palace. After the
authorized period, Vacation Tours continued to advertise listings and
schedule reservations at Bavaro Palace and maintained the domain
name "http://bavaropalace.com" to advertise the Barcel6 Bavaro Palace
and competing hotels on Bavaro Beach.'6 9 Bavaro Palace demanded
that Vacation Tours cease placing advertisements and using the domain
name because those uses violated its common law rights in the mark
"BAVARO PALACE". 7 '
The district court held and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed that the mark BAVARO PALACE was merely descriptive of a place and had not acquired secondary meaning.' 7 1 Accordingly, Bavaro Palace had no enforceable trademark rights under either the
Lanham Act 72 or the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
3
Act. 17
In KEG Technologies, Inc. v. Laimer, 74 the district court granted
damages for the Lanham Act violation of using the likeness of KEG's
product without authorization in a product catalog.1 7' Although KEG
had been granted default judgment, the court determined that this
status did not mandate awarding actual damages against Laimer.' 6
The court limited the award of damages to Laimer's profits arising out
of sales from the particular product catalog rather than Laimer's entire
profits since the founding of their competing enterprise.177 Furthermore, the court rejected awarding treble damages because KEG had not
shown willful infringement. 178 The court enjoined Laimer from further
79
use of the likeness of KEG's products.
In Phoenix of Broward,Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,' the district court
denied Burger King franchisees the ability to bring claims of false
advertising based on an alleged fraud in McDonald's Monopoly game

168. Id. at 255-56. The case also discusses issues of Florida trademark law, which this
survey will not address.
169. Id. at 254.
170. Id. at 254-55.
171. Id. at 255-56.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
173. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 16, and 28 U.S.C.); Bavaro Palace,203 F. App'x at 256.
174. 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
175. Id. at 1375.
176. Id. at 1373.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1374.
179. Id. at 1374-75.
180. 441 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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promotion.'8 1 The court adopted a multi-factor test employed by the
Third and Fifth Circuits to determine whether the franchisees had
182
prudential standing to bring a Lanham Act false advertising claim.
The court rejected the harder rule of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits. 8 ' The multi-factor test, taken from Conte Bros. Automotive
v. Quaker State-Slick, Inc.,"" considered the following factors: "(1) the
nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury, (2) the directness or indirectness
of the asserted injury, (3) the proximity or remoteness of the party to the
alleged injurious conduct, (4) the speculativeness of the damages claim,
and (5) the risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning
damages."'
The court thus concluded that the franchisees lacked
prudential standing under this fact pattern.'
Presumably, the
Burger King corporate entity would have the standing to bring such an
action. 8 7
In International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 8' the
Eleventh Circuit held that the standard for good faith for fair use of
another's trademark is the same as the legal standard for good faith in
any other trademark infringement context, namely, "whether the alleged
infringer intended to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by
creating confusion as to the source of the goods or services. " 8' 9 International Stamp Art had obtained a nonexclusive license to reproduce
U.S. Postal Service stamps as artwork while the U.S. Postal Service
maintained a copyright in the images. International Stamp Art took this
one step further and reproduced these stamp art works with perforated
edges like a stamp. International Stamp Art then obtained a trademark
registration on this perforated edge styling. When the U.S. Postal
Service launched a similar art service complete with perforated edges,
International Stamp Art claimed that the perforated edge infringed its
trademark. The parties agreed that International Stamp Art's mark was
incontestable. 190

181. Id. at 1252. Claims for patent infringement, among others, were also brought, but
they are not discussed herein.
182. Id. at 1249.
183. Id.
184. 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
185. Phoenix of Broward, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (quoting Conte Bros., 165 F.3d
at 233-35).
186. Id. at 1252.
187. Id.
188. 456 F.3d 1270 (lth Cir. 2006).
189. Id. at 1274, 1275.
190. Id. at 1271-74.
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Accordingly, the court focused on whether the U.S. Postal Service was
making a fair use of the mark.19' In applying the good faith standard,
the court did not find any evidence that the U.S. Postal Service was
attempting to trade on International Stamp Art's good will." Moreover, the court concluded that the U.S. Postal Service used the perforated edges other than as a mark and used the perforated edges descriptively.193 Accordingly, the U.S. Postal Service had a valid fair use
defense.' 9
In Angel Flight of Georgia, Inc. v. Angel Flight Southeast, Inc.,'95 the
district court rejected the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
two issues.'9
Both parties had used the mark "ANGEL FLIGHT" in
connection with their separate services of free air transportation to and
from hospitals for needy persons. 9 7 The plaintiff operated in Georgia;
the defendant operated in Florida but eventually began operations in
Georgia as well. The plaintiff cited instances of confusion between the
parties in filing its suit.' 9 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
claims were not barred by the doctrine of laches because the plaintiff
had brought its claims within the window from which they ripened.' 99
The court further held that even if the claims could be barred by the
doctrine of laches, the court could still intervene to prevent consumer
confusion.2" Factual questions remained on this issue and a remaining false advertising claim that could not be resolved through motions
for summary judgment.2"'
The Georgia Supreme Court issued an interesting holding on the
inability to compel state enforcement of a trademark-related law. In
Bland Farms, LLC v. Georgia Department of Agriculture,0 2 the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of an action seeking to
compel state enforcement of the Vidalia Onion Act of 1986.203 Growers
and sellers of Vidalia onions had asserted that the Georgia Department

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
2006).

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277.
424 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
281 Ga. 192, 637 S.E.2d 37 (2006).
Id. at 192, 195, 637 S.E.2d at 39, 41; O.C.G.A. §§ 2-14-130 to -138 (2000 & Supp.
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of Agriculture and Commissioner of Agriculture should stop some Vidalia
onion producers from adding "Certified Sweet"2" 4 trademarks to their
Vidalia onion labels and advertisements.2 5 These trademarks were
licensed by National Onions Labs and were based on a testing system
called "Sweetometer."2 8 The court held that the growers and sellers
could not bring an action to force the Commissioner to conclude that a
violation had occurred, in part, because the agency had discretion to
allocate its enforcement resources and the agency therefore had the
discretion not to allocate resources to enforcing the "Certified Sweet"
trademarks in this case.20 7
IV.

COPYRIGHT

Copyright law is exclusively federal law. The Eleventh Circuit and the
federal district courts in Georgia had a particularly active docket of
cases involving copyright issues in 2006.
In Thompson v. Looney's Tavern Productions, Inc.,208 the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Looney's
209
Tavern for claims arising out of an author's historically based play.

The author, Thompson, wrote several historically set works, including
"Tories of the Hills," "Free State of Winston," and "So Turns the
Tide."210 The author claimed that Looney's Tavern had infringed on
her works through (1) scripts and performances in 1996 through 1999 of
the play "Looney's Tavern: the Aftermath and the Legacy"; (2) scripts
and performances in 2000 through 2002 of the play "The Incident at
Looney's Tavern"; and (3) the "Freedom Run" screenplay.211
As to the author's first claim, the district court dismissed the claims
for infringing performances in 1996 and 1997 as barred by the statue of
limitations, and the dismissal was not raised on appeal. 212 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding
that the 1998 and 1999 plays were not infringing for two reasons.2 3
First, the court concluded that estoppel could form a basis for granting
summary judgment to Looney's Tavern when the author had known of

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Bland Farms,281 Ga. at 192, 637 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194-95, 637 S.E.2d at 40.
204 F. App'x 844 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850-51.
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the infringement since 1996 and the author's counsel had informed
Looney's Tavern that its work was not infringing.2 14 Second, a coauthor, without approval of the plaintiff author, granted Looney's Tavern
a license to use the work.2 1 This license was sufficient to protect
Looney's Tavern. 1 '
The court similarly upheld summary judgment in favor of Looney's
Tavern on the second claim. 217 The 2000 to 2002 plays relied heavily
on material from another play that Looney's Tavern was licensed to
use.21 Furthermore, the court could find only one sentence of the
2000 work that could arguably be infringing.1 9
The court noted the lesser copyright protection for certain aspects of
the author's work when it discussed the third claim.220 In particular,
the court followed precedent and held that historical facts are not
entitled to copyright protection.22 ' Moreover, the court noted that the
stories relayed in the infringed work were different between
the author's
222
copyrighted works and Looney's Tavern's screenplay.
In Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc.,2 the Eleventh Circuit declined to
uphold a district court's interpretation of the Communications Decency
Act 224 ("CDA") as preempting certain common law claims of Thais
Almeida against Amazon.com.

25

Almeida had been photographed as

a child with the permission of her mother, and this photograph subse226
quently appeared on a book cover for a book sold on Amazon.com.

Almeida brought two claims under Florida statutory law for right of
publicity and civil theft violations and a third claim under Florida
common law for invasion of privacy.227 The CDA contains a provision
that shields an "interactive computer service" from liability as a
publisher or speaker when it acts in good faith..2 28 Although the court
ultimately dismissed the claim, it did so because Amazon.com could not

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 850.

Id.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 853-54.
456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1318.
Id. at 1318-19.
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1321 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).
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have been held liable under Florida law as a publisher regardless of the
CDA.229
In Watkins v. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc.,230 an Eleventh Circuit
panel held that a letter from the U.S. Copyright Office was admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) to show whether a work was
registered. 23' The author, John Watkins, brought suit against The
Augusta Chronicle for publishing a photograph of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. from Watkins's book King's Last Visit to Augusta (Dr. King was
persona non grata).2 2 The court noted that the letter fell under the
public reports and records exception to the hearsay rule because it was
a report of a public office or agency, its findings resulted from an
authorized search of copyright registration records, and the letter did not
present any contracting information.2 33 Because the letter showed that
Watkins did not have a registered copyright, summary judgment was
granted in favor of The Augusta Chronicle in Watkins's claim for
copyright infringement damages.234
In CBS Broadcasting,Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp.,235 the
Eleventh Circuit denied a compulsory copyright license2 36 to satellite

broadcaster EchoStar2 37 to rebroadcast television programming
through its satellite network in an action brought by various broadcast23
ers, including CBS.

The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988239

gave satellite providers a compulsory license to transmit television
programming to underserved areas.24 ° The broadcasters successfully
alleged before the district court that EchoStar was serving privileged
areas and therefore violating their right under the copyright laws of
being able to control the distribution of their content. 24' The Eleventh
Circuit largely affirmed this holding.242

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1324.
163 F. App'x 823 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 825.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.

234.

Id.

235. 450 F.3d 505 (11th Cir. 2006).
236. United States copyright law establishes a system for granting compulsory licenses
in the entertainment industry to help facilitate the distribution of copyrighted material on,
for example, a radio station or webcast.
237. Doing business as DISH Network.
238. CBS Broad., 450 F.3d at 508.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
240. CBS Broad., 450 F.3d at 508.
241. Id. at 508-09.
242. Id. at 509.
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In E Beats Music v. Andrews,2" the district court awarded a default
judgment to the music industry organization that brought charges of
copyright infringement against a bar and its owners for not paying the
appropriate performance royalties.2 " Although the analysis of copyright infringement was fairly standard, the court also granted summary
judgment against the bar managing entity and its owner in their
separate, individual capacities. 2" The court reasoned that although
neither controlled the day-to-day selection of music, these entities had
the "ultimate authority" to supervise activities at the bar and to control
the conduct of the primary infringer.2 " Accordingly, they were jointly
and severally liable for the infringement.24 v
In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Systems International,
Inc.,24 the district court denied the copyright and trademark infringement claims of Gulfstream, an aircraft manufacturer, against Camp, a
service tracking company, for use of Gulfstream's aircraft owner's
manuals.2 4' Gulfstream competed with Camp in helping customers
schedule maintenance for their aircraft. Gulfstream refused to provide
manuals to Camp and, in response, Camp borrowed its customers'
manuals and copied relevant information from those manuals into its
computer system.2 50 As to the copyright claim, the court was disinclined to extend copyright protection to the manuals because they were
written to conform to federal guidelines, but the court still performed
fair use analysis because Camp conceded that limited copyright
protection was available.2"' In analyzing fair use, the court was most
heavily persuaded by the fact that the use did not affect the market for
or value of the work.252 Furthermore, the court expressed a desire to
prevent Gulfstream from leveraging its copyright protection to create a
monopoly in providing service tracking.2 53
In SCQuARE International, Ltd. v. BBDO Atlanta, Inc. 24 a case
including both copyright and trademark infringement claims, the
plaintiff, SCQuARE, provided training services to BBDO as to SCQu-

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
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433 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1324-25.
Id. at 1325-28.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
428 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1372-82.
Id. at 1372-73.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
455 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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ARE's method for teaching problem-solving and communication skills.
BBDO signed a contract that recognized SCQuARE's copyright in its
training materials and agreed not to duplicate or use those training
materials. BBDO then created two abbreviated manuals: "SCQuARE
for Dummies" and "SCQuARE and the Continuous Promise."255
Although one of BBDO's manuals "quotes directly from the SCQuARE
Manual and incorporates exact replicas of original graphics and
templates that appear in the SCQuARE Manual," the court held that the
question of comparing the works remained a close question that should
be reserved for trial. 2 6 Nonetheless, these verbatim quotes were
sufficient for the court to deny BBDO's motion for summary judgment
that its abbreviated manuals were protected under the idea-expression
dichotomy because there was significant evidence that BBDO had
"crossed the line" into unauthorized copying of expression. 2 7 Similarly, the court also denied both BBDO's claims for protection under the
merger doctrine and under the fair use doctrine 25" and BBDO's motion
for summary judgment as to SCQuARE's trademark infringement,
deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract claims. 259 The court,
however, granted SCQuARE's summary judgment motion as to its claim
for breach of contract.6 °

V. FINAL NOTES
January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2006 was an interesting and
very active period in the intellectual property field. As usual, the courts
heard and decided cases interpreting some of the more precedent-setting
cases handed down over the previous few years. Many of the decided
cases continue in the direction the courts are headed, towards a stricter
interpretation of the rights granted under the intellectual property laws.
Thus, intellectual property practitioners may have to be even more
careful in the drafting of patents, licenses, and contracts.
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